From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

...


You know, the field, of, formal methods, and particularly
here, "the terminal in the interminable", all the issues
involved and resolved in the supposition and dispatch and
resolution and what can't be logical paradox, it's of interest.



You guys' love spats though, it's more like, "get a room".


That the classical is sort of singular, and, there's
a sort of super-classical the multiplicity, has that
here, for models of computation and models of knowledge,
and certification of the results as it were, "proof", in
theory, has pretty much that if there's thrashing and flailing
it's not being done correctly, pretty much has that
you have to get above this stuff, if there's not something
_new_ in the post, it's _noise_, if there's not a proper
novel, derivative statement, it's not _signal_, _information_.



About information and free information in physics, and
models of computation, which work on information, that
their input and output is work and information, has that
actors and agents can use information and perspective,
to effect their own inputs, and besides the Aristotle's
entropy and Leibniz' entropy, and the source and/or sink
of destiny and these kinds of things, makes for the old
"Scylla and Charybdis" bit: "keep it in the middle".


Now it's established that ZFC includes a restriction of
comprehension, and that somebody like Mirimanoff introduced
what became the Axiom of Regularity, and it's an opinion
and a stipulation and there are other, there are the others,
that if you really want to know then it involves learning
about Mirimanoff's, or, your own, "extra-ordinary", "l'extraordinaire",
because otherwise trying to stretch the limits of theory
within the limits of the ordinary theory, results that
"the theories the theories the theories: meta-fragment theory",
either is or isn't a theory, and it's true.


It's true that some people don't know that ordinals and sets
are fundamentally different and though that they have ready
models of the initial that build infinite limits and completions
in terms of each other, that the theory of "the universe of
the logical objects", has that it's matters of perspective,
and perspicuity, for universals and particulars and these
kinds of things, and type theory and "inverting the diamond",
the universe of relations of type, it starts being easier
to have critical analysis always included instead of
picking a fixed course when neither will do.

Maybe it would help to introduce an "Aristotle's demon",
what he does is arbitrarily re-orders and disarrays and
sequence of syllogisms, so that of course only the relevant
result coherent, and what was in any way plainly dependent
on contradiction or not compounded the induction by all
matters of deduction, is not constructivists and results
not intuitionist.

Now, one might aver, "there's no Aristotle's demon and
there's no Maxwell's demon", yet, yet it's rather provable,
or not, one way or the other, and, anybody who makes and
stays the course between the rock and the hard place,
is highly dependent that they do and don't exist.

I.e., the idea is, "there's no Aristotle's demon and
there's no Maxwell's demon", but, anybody who thinks
about it sort of rather is their own Aristotle's angel
and Maxwell's angel.

Now, I've just kind of invented this idea of "Aristotle's
demon", but the idea is that the apparatus and mechanics
of robust theorem-proving depend on it not mattering
whether it exists, or not.


In these sorts cases, the "quasi-modal", is yet a mode,
just as classical theory is just a singularity,
so, it's called critical reasoning, and, often enough
it's the development of the dialectic to maintain
the development of a dialectic, that otherwise results
these sorts, ..., kook fights, that result poisoning the
well, tragedizing the commons, when here we have a
free theory where "Aristotle's demon can't destroy
comprehensive critical categorical closure".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxwell%27s_demon

Which the quasi-modal is not.

So, Aristotle's demon, or Aristotle's gremlin,
here is a concept that takes, for example, any
sorts plain fallacious rhetoric, on its own,
and results for example "must both be wrong".

Thus it is upon you to always be making work
for Aristotle's gremlin, for Maxwell's will do none.


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From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

On 03/17/2024 12:50 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

...

You know, the field, of, formal methods, and particularly
here, "the terminal in the interminable", all the issues
involved and resolved in the supposition and dispatch and
resolution and what can't be logical paradox, it's of interest.

You guys' love spats though, it's more like, "get a room".

That the classical is sort of singular, and, there's
a sort of super-classical the multiplicity, has that
here, for models of computation and models of knowledge,
and certification of the results as it were, "proof", in
theory, has pretty much that if there's thrashing and flailing
it's not being done correctly, pretty much has that
you have to get above this stuff, if there's not something
_new_ in the post, it's _noise_, if there's not a proper
novel, derivative statement, it's not _signal_, _information_.

About information and free information in physics, and
models of computation, which work on information, that
their input and output is work and information, has that
actors and agents can use information and perspective,
to effect their own inputs, and besides the Aristotle's
entropy and Leibniz' entropy, and the source and/or sink
of destiny and these kinds of things, makes for the old
"Scylla and Charybdis" bit: "keep it in the middle".

Now it's established that ZFC includes a restriction of
comprehension, and that somebody like Mirimanoff introduced
what became the Axiom of Regularity, and it's an opinion
and a stipulation and there are other, there are the others,
that if you really want to know then it involves learning
about Mirimanoff's, or, your own, "extra-ordinary", "l'extraordinaire", because otherwise trying to stretch the limits of theory
within the limits of the ordinary theory, results that
"the theories the theories the theories: meta-fragment theory",
either is or isn't a theory, and it's true.

It's true that some people don't know that ordinals and sets
are fundamentally different and though that they have ready
models of the initial that build infinite limits and completions
in terms of each other, that the theory of "the universe of
the logical objects", has that it's matters of perspective,
and perspicuity, for universals and particulars and these
kinds of things, and type theory and "inverting the diamond",
the universe of relations of type, it starts being easier
to have critical analysis always included instead of
picking a fixed course when neither will do.

Maybe it would help to introduce an "Aristotle's demon",
what he does is arbitrarily re-orders and disarrays and
sequence of syllogisms, so that of course only the relevant
result coherent, and what was in any way plainly dependent
on contradiction or not compounded the induction by all
matters of deduction, is not constructivists and results
not intuitionist.

Now, one might aver, "there's no Aristotle's demon and
there's no Maxwell's demon", yet, yet it's rather provable,
or not, one way or the other, and, anybody who makes and
stays the course between the rock and the hard place,
is highly dependent that they do and don't exist.

I.e., the idea is, "there's no Aristotle's demon and
there's no Maxwell's demon", but, anybody who thinks
about it sort of rather is their own Aristotle's angel
and Maxwell's angel.

Now, I've just kind of invented this idea of "Aristotle's
demon", but the idea is that the apparatus and mechanics
of robust theorem-proving depend on it not mattering
whether it exists, or not.

In these sorts cases, the "quasi-modal", is yet a mode,
just as classical theory is just a singularity,
so, it's called critical reasoning, and, often enough
it's the development of the dialectic to maintain
the development of a dialectic, that otherwise results
these sorts, ..., kook fights, that result poisoning the
well, tragedizing the commons, when here we have a
free theory where "Aristotle's demon can't destroy
comprehensive critical categorical closure".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxwell%27s_demon

Which the quasi-modal is not.

So, Aristotle's demon, or Aristotle's gremlin,
here is a concept that takes, for example, any
sorts plain fallacious rhetoric, on its own,
and results for example "must both be wrong".

Thus it is upon you to always be making work
for Aristotle's gremlin, for Maxwell's will do none.

McKeon on Aristotle.

"Scholars have differed concerning the authenticity,
order, and relation of Aristotle's works: some have found
a unity in them so precise and well articulated that every
science and art, and every body of conclusions, and
even the meanings, applications, and functions of every
word can be accounted for and justified; others have
found masses of contradictions and collections of cliches,
half-truths, and palpable errors; still others have found stages
of development which require the reordering of the works
and their parts into those which are Platonic, those which
mark a skeptical doubt and tentative transition, and those
which develop a characteristic mature empirical method
and philosophy. There have been many interpretations of
Aristotle, and grounds have been found in his writings
and in his times for each of them. It is unlikely that a
single authoritarian interpretation will be discovered
which will secure consensus and establish a coherent doctrine.
The only way to resolve problems in the interpretation of
Aristotle is by reading and rereading his works. Many
contradictions encountered in a first reading are removed
by rereading a text in the context of what he says elsewhere.
The virtue of removal of contradictions is not that it vindicates
an image of the master as a shrewd observer, a keen analyst,
and a systematic thinker who remembers what he has said
before in different connections and in relation to different problems,
but that it brings the reader into contact with meanings, applications, implications, and doctrines rather than with dubious, incoherent,
and meaningless statements. It is that rightness and suggestivity
which accounts for the long, diversified influence of Aristotle's
works and for the no less persistent, strenuous, and fruitful
oppositions which they have aroused. A new reader coming
to those works for the first time need not be abashed by the
complexity of the works or the intricacy of the tradition: he
need not seek to learn the philosophy of Aristotle, but he
cannot avoid contact with philosophic problems which become
significant and develop philosophic implications as he comes
to perceive the consequences and perspectives which open up
in the considerations and resolutions of problems. Such an
introduction to Aristotle is an introduction to philosophy and
to science, art, action, and life."

(Yes, that's one paragraph, slightly longer than one page.)

So, Aristotle's demon, here, is a great idea. It helps very
well go hand in hand with Maxwell's demon. As well,
the word would be familiar, because "demon" arrives
from "eudaimonia".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudaimonia


The idea that "Aristotle's demon" thoroughly disorganizes
and makes into disarray, that information gets worked free,
while "Maxwell's demon" naturally does nothing, then
that actions of thought and reason make Aristotle's demon
stop working and Maxwell's demon start working,
that's a good one, I'm glad I thought of that.

I hope you would also, understand that it helps reflect
very much what's going on in the ideas of information
and word, and Aristotle's entropy and Leibniz' entropy,
that there are hand-in-hand Aristotle's and Maxwell's
demon in the Dirac positronic and Einstein white-hole sea.


It's like, "where's Schroedinger's cat in this", and
Aristotle's demon is like "it'll come out in the wash".

Which it puts _everything_ through.

Hopefully, you know, ready to go.


Richard McKeon, ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_McKeon
"His ideas formed the basis for the UN's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights".

"McKeon holds that the renaissance revolt against scholasticism involved Aristotle in an "associated discredit", and few outstanding modern
philosophers took the pains to examine the grounds of the criticism or
to re-examine the philosophy of Aristotle. He credits Leibniz and Hegel
as exceptions."


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